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FM THE SITUATION ROOM
TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
JEM

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ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

PASS TO BREMER/GOMPERT FOR THE SECRETARY
OCTOBER 31, 1974

TO: JERRY BREMER FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

1. WHCA HAS JUST INFORMED ME THAT THE CAIRO HOTLINE
IS NOW IN OPERATION.

DOS Review Completed.

2. DON KENDALL CALLED TO TELL ME OF A TELEPHONE
CONVERSATION HE HAD HAD WITH THE PRESIDENT, REPORTING
ON HIS RECENT MEETING WITH BREZHNEV. HE TOLD THE PRESIDENT
BREZHNEV HAD TOLD HIM HE HAD HEARD CONFLICTING RUMORS
ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE U.S. AND, MORE SPECIFICALLY,
ABOUT THE PRESIDENT AND YOU, AND HE WAS WONDERING WHAT
THE SITUATION WAS AND WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN. KENDALL SAID
THAT HE TOLD BREZHNEV THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD ASSURED
HIM THAT U.S. POLICY WOULD CONTINUE AND THAT YOU WOULD
CONTINUE TO PLAY THE KEY ROLE YOU HAD IN THE PAST.
KENDALL SAID THAT BREZHNEV HAD ALSO MENTIONED THAT HE HAD
HEARD TALK ABOUT SPLITTING YOUR TWO JOBS, SUCH TALK
EMANATING FROM PEOPLE CLOSE TO THE PRESIDENT LIKE
LAIRD. AT THAT POINT, KENDALL SAID, THE PRESIDENT
INTERRUPTED HIM AND SAID THAT HE WANTED KENDALL TO KNOW
AND TO TELL BREZHNEV WHEN HE NEXT SAW HIM THAT HE HAD
TOTAL CONFIDENCE IN YOU AND THAT HE FELT THAT YOU HAD
CONFIDENCE IN HIM, IN THE SENSE OF GIVING HIM THE
FREEDOM TO RUN THINGS. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT YOU WOULD
CONTINUE TO HAVE HIS TOTAL SUPPORT. ABOUT THE LAIRD
ASPECT, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT WHEN THE TRANSITION TEAM
MADE ITS REPORT TO HIM, ONE MEMBER HAD MENTIONED THE
POSSIBILITY OF SPLITTING THE JOBS. THE PRESIDENT SAID
HE HAD RESPONDED THAT THAT WOULD NOT HAPPEN AND HE WANTED
NO FURTHER DISCUSSION OF IT. HE MADE IT CLEAR, HE TOLD
KENDALL, THAT THAT IS THE WAY IT WAS AND WOULD REMAIN.
THE PRESIDENT ADDED THAT SO FAR AS MEL LAIRD WAS CON-
CERNED, HE DOES GO AROUND TALKING A LOT, BUT HE IS NOT
AS CLOSE TO THE PRESIDENT AS HE THINKS. HE TALKS TOO
MUCH AND "GOES AROUND TELLING PEOPLE ABOUT HIS INFLUENCE
WITH ME (THE PRESIDENT) -- AND THAT HE DOES NOT HAVE."
KENDALL WENT ON TO SAY THAT BREZHNEV HAD MADE CLEAR THE
DEEP RELIANCE THEY PLACED ON YOU AS THE SYMBOL OF U.S.
POLICY AND OF RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.
KENDALL SAID HE CONVEYED ALL THIS TO THE PRESIDENT AND
THE OVERALL IMPRESSION HE HAD WAS VERY VERY REASSURING WITH
RESPECT TO YOU -- BOTH ON THE MOSCOW END AND ON
THE WHITE HOUSE END. THOUGHT YOU WOULD LIKE TO KNOW.

3. THE PRESIDENT ASKED WHATEVER HAPPENED ABOUT DEAN
RUSK. I HAVE JUST CHECKED WITH LARRY AND WILL INFORM THE
PRESIDENT WHEN HE RETURNS FROM THE CAMPAIGN SWING
SATURDAY NIGHT. DO YOU HAVE ANY OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS
YOU WOULD LIKE TO ADVANCE FOR THAT POST? I GET THE

4. THE PRESIDENT ALSO ASKED SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PAPER ON THE GENEVA PROTOCOL. HE HAD OBVIOUSLY READ IT VERY CAREFULLY AND BASICALLY WANTED TO REVIEW WHAT HE UNDERSTOOD OUR POSITION WAS -- THAT WE COULD NOT SUPPORT THE DEFENSE VIEW INASMUCH AS FULBRIGHT WOULD NOT ACCEPT AN UNCHANGED POSITION, AND YET WE WANTED TO PRESERVE AS MUCH MILITARY FLEXIBILITY AS POSSIBLE. AFTER ASSURING HIMSELF THAT WAS THE CASE HE SAID HE THOUGHT THE POSITION IN THE PAPER WAS JUST RIGHT AND THAT WE SHOULD MAKE A STRONG PITCH FOR IT IN OUR CONSULTATIONS ON THE HILL.

WARM REGARDS.

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SECRET

SENSITIVE